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Summary  
 
 
1 Introduction 
The government has embarked on a radical policy of decentralisation in 
England, which has been termed ‘localism’. Decentralisation from superior to 
lower tiers of government is a global trend. The government’s approach has a 
particular character in this context in seeking decentralisation both to the 
lowest tiers of government and away from government to the individual. The 
localism agenda is also linked to proposals aiming to increase the rate of local 
economic growth, rebalancing the economy in sectoral and spatial terms and 
promoting wellbeing in England. This rapidly evolving policy agenda is based 
upon principles that are challenging to test rigorously and examine empirically. 
In principle, the government’s approach is a particular form of decentralisation 
that has radical and experimental characteristics and is distinct from the kinds 
of decentralisation that have been tried and tested elsewhere internationally. 
The current study aims to consider the international evidence about the 
impacts of decentralisation. It seeks to identify systematically the arguments 
concerning the social and economic impacts of decentralisation and articulate 
key issues relevant to the policy debate.  
 
2 Policy context 
Decentralisation of government and governance is an international 
phenomenon. The rationale is that this process meets multiple objectives of 
increasing the efficiency of public services, improving legitimacy and 
accountability of political institutions and fostering the growth of local and 
regional economies. Internationally, we can identify a widespread, if 
heterogeneous, trend toward decentralisation by national governments. 
Decentralisation comes in different shapes and sizes conditioned by broader 
processes of globalisation, the growing complexity of the state and growing 
demands upon it and the variety of motivations and national contexts 
(historical, political, economic) in which it has been introduced. Distinct 
territorial or political identities were a key rationale in early shifts toward more 
decentralised state structures, but latterly economic arguments have 
dominated as governments seek an ‘economic dividend’ from decentralisation 
in terms of efficiency gains and improved economic growth. In this regard, 
governments and international organisations such as the World Bank, OECD 
and EU expect decentralisation to provide local services more efficiently and 
promote greater incentives to stimulate local economic growth. The 
government policy agenda in England constitutes a particular version of these 
broader processes and rationales in focusing upon the relationship between 
decentralisation, localism and the ‘Big Society’. The main motivations being 
improved efficiency in the delivery of public services, the promotion of local 
economic growth as part of efforts to rebalance the UK economy, sectorally 
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and spatially, and the promotion of wellbeing as a new and broader measure 
of development. Debate continues about the connections and contradictions 
between these agendas and as an evolving policy agenda it is difficult to 
predict its impacts.  
 
3 Literature review 
The international literature on decentralisation is focused upon the 
redistribution of power and resources to lower tiers of government. The 
literature produces ambiguous and at times contradictory findings about the 
impacts of decentralisation on governance, public services, local growth and 
wellbeing. These are partly the result of data and methodological limitations 
and a product of the questions that are asked. For example, we find quite 
contradictory evidence about the impacts of decentralisation on the efficiency 
of local services, reflecting the difficulties in finding adequate means of 
measurement and data and depending upon the specific policy areas 
addressed. In addition, the literature on decentralisation tends, with one or two 
exceptions, not to draw strong distinctions between the efficacies of different 
tiers of sub-national government covering a variety of spatial scales, tending 
instead to explore the principles of decentralisation itself. We show that as an 
international phenomenon decentralisation has adopted many forms and been 
enacted at different spatial scales. Thus, much of the international literature is 
concerned with decentralisation to the regional instead of —or as well as — 
the local scale and terms such as decentralisation and devolution are often 
used interchangeably. The review of studies reveals the challenges of 
analysing decentralisation processes at the local scale. Therefore, we focus 
on assessing the evidence of the impacts of decentralisation more broadly 
defined, while attempting where possible to assess it in relation to the rapidly 
evolving policy agenda of localism in England. The report shows that such a 
focus provides evidence that has a strong bearing on government policy 
toward decentralisation in England. 
 
4 Decentralisation and wellbeing 
The relationship between decentralisation and subjective wellbeing is a new 
research area and it is highly relevant to the debate about current government 
policy. This empirical analysis shifts the focus away from the uncertain 
impacts of decentralisation on the efficiency of public services and focuses 
upon the perceptions of citizens about decentralisation and its value to them. 
The analysis shows that, in broad terms, high degrees of decentralisation are 
associated with higher levels of subjective well-being among citizens. This 
positive effect of political and fiscal decentralisation variables on satisfaction 
and happiness establishes a relationship whereby citizens appear to be happy 
not only with the transfer of resources – which is an indicator of the capacity of 
local governments to implement policies – but also with the ability to conduct 
policies at the local level – which is represented here by the transfer of powers 
to sub-national governments.  With the exception of satisfaction with the 
health system, the association between greater decentralisation and 
subjective wellbeing is more strongly associated with perceptions such as 
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satisfaction with government, democracy or overall happiness. This contrasts 
the relatively weaker association between greater decentralisation and 
subjective wellbeing relating to more concrete entities such as satisfaction 
with government or with the education system. The fiscal dimension, which 
represents a more concrete dimension of decentralisation, is wholly 
connected with satisfaction and happiness. The results reveal that citizens 
appear to be happier in the context of their local governments having a say on 
their daily politics and policies and with their actual capacity to deliver. Overall, 
the results highlight that both political and fiscal decentralisation matter, but 
that it is the fiscal dimension of decentralisation which seems to be most 
relevant for citizens. Decentralisation matters positively for the satisfaction of 
individuals with political institutions and with the specific delivery of some 
public goods and services. Reflecting upon causation, while it is perfectly 
feasible to envisage that policies derived from decentralised governments 
would influence individual happiness, it is much more difficult to envisage that 
changes in individual happiness will affect decisions on decentralisation. 
 
 
 
5 Decentralisation and inequality 
The relationship between fiscal and political decentralisation, income 
inequality and level of development is an under-explored area and an 
important set of issues in the context of government policy. The results of the 
analysis demonstrate that greater fiscal – more than political – 
decentralisation is associated with lower income inequality. The analysis 
demonstrates that the influence of decentralisation on interpersonal inequality 
is stronger than expected. It also suggests that this relationship is highly 
influenced by the level of development of the region to which authority and 
funds are being decentralised. However, the direction of the relationship 
counters most theoretical predictions. Against the view that worse-off regions 
would be disadvantaged because of capacity and funding constraints, which 
could prevent them from effectively implementing policies which could reduce 
interpersonal inequality, it is precisely these less well-off regions which seem 
to be benefiting the most from the inequality-reducing effects of fiscal 
decentralisation processes. There is no identifiable threshold level because as 
income rises, the association declines and even changes to a statistically 
positive relationship, with some higher income regions displaying a higher 
degree of interpersonal inequality than their more centralised counterparts. In 
terms of causation, the findings suggest the potential for particular forms of 
decentralisation to ameliorate inter-personal income inequalities under certain 
conditions and that this capability is strongly determined by overall levels of 
development. 
 
 
6 
 
6 Conclusions and policy implications 
This report has sought to examine the international evidence about the 
impacts of decentralisation in order to inform government policy concerning 
England in relation to decentralisation, localism and the ‘Big Society’. We 
have sought to situate the study in the international literature which typically 
concerns the decentralisation of authority from national to sub-national (mainly 
regional) governments. We have been less concerned about spatial scale 
than we have about what we can learn about decentralisation as a general 
principle in the rescaling of the state. We demonstrate that there are many 
different types of decentralisation at various spatial scales, involving a range 
of powers and resources. Moreover, the context and conditions of the design, 
rationale and implementation of decentralisation strongly shape its effects. As 
a result, in the literature the impacts of decentralisation on issues such as the 
efficiency and accessibility of local services and on local growth appear 
ambiguous and inconclusive. The international review suggests it is hard to 
draw any general conclusions about whether different kinds of 
decentralisation will improve or impair government quality and economic 
efficiency. This is because the multiple effects moving in different directions 
across different dimensions are shaped by numerous conditions and are 
difficult systematically to isolate and assess. Disentangling the impacts of 
decentralisation at particular spatial scales (e.g. regional or local) is especially 
difficult and the literature rarely preoccupies itself with this distinction. Most 
existing studies are mainly concerned with measuring impacts at the sub-
national scales – for example in Spanish Autonomous Communities, Swiss 
Cantons and Italian Regions – and only in a few cases with the municipality 
and not at all with communities and neighbourhoods. 
We observe the inherent difficulties of measuring the impacts of 
decentralisation which partly explain the apparently contradictory results from 
various studies and also the difficulties of comparing between cases selected 
from different national contexts.  For these reasons, we use a novel approach 
to address two specific issues where research on the impacts of 
decentralisation has been limited, but are especially relevant to government’s 
current emphasis upon the individual and highly local forms of decentralisation. 
The novelty of our approach is that it focuses on the impact of decentralisation 
on the individual rather than the performance of territorial jurisdictions. This 
approach was taken because, first, it focuses attention on decentralisation as 
a principle rather than seeking to disentangle its impacts at different spatial 
scales. Second, current government policy debates are especially concerned 
with the impacts of decentralisation on individuals. The analyses reported in 
this study represent the first attempt to address this question directly. With our 
focus on the individual in mind, we examined the impacts of decentralisation 
on subjective well-being and inter-personal inequality and level of 
development. 
The results of our analyses cast powerful light on two key areas of the 
government policy debate. The evidence suggests that decentralisation can 
contribute to an improved sense of citizen well-being and concerns that, in 
particular contexts, decentralisation will generate increased inequality may 
have been overstated. What are the policy implications of these findings? Any 
policy implications must be qualified given the different kinds of 
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decentralisation and the conditional nature of its operation that makes it highly 
dependent upon the context in which it is introduced. In addition, given the 
exploratory nature of the analysis, the results should be considered with 
caution in shaping policy in specific cases especially in directly attributing 
causation, given the strength of quantitative analysis in identifying and 
measuring the extant relationships, and extending its findings from the 
regional to the local level. With these qualifications in mind our research 
allows us to suggest the following policy issues: 
• There is a need for much greater clarity in the definition, specification 
and rationale of exactly what kind and degree of decentralisation is 
planned by the government in England, and what its precise aims and 
goals are: Is it seeking to make services more efficient or more 
accountable? Is the aim to improve subjective wellbeing? Is the goal 
reducing levels of inter-personal inequality? In particular, the 
relationships between decentralisation and its spatial scale need to be 
explained and clarified with greater care.  While government may not 
be seeking to establish a blueprint, the principles of the particular kinds 
of decentralisation sought need to reflect what the review and evidence 
here demonstrates: decentralisation can have positive and negative 
impacts at various spatial scales but current policy focuses only on the 
local scale as the source of gains in efficiency and accountability. The 
rationales for the government’s particular kind of decentralisation need 
clearer explanation and stronger evidence. Moreover, the existing 
evidence on the impacts of decentralisation mainly concerns the 
performance of sub-national jurisdictions (e.g. regions, provinces, 
municipalities) with very little treatment of issues that could be seen as 
proxies of localism as understood in current debates about the 
governance of England.  
• The results reported here suggest that, internationally, citizens are 
positive in the context of the fiscal dimensions and capacities of 
decentralised institutions at the sub-national level.  Such decentralised 
institutions are associated with higher levels of personal subjective 
well-being. As a key decentralised institution in the context of England, 
the analysis highlights local government’s critical role in articulating and 
representing the potential of the kinds of decentralisation and localism 
that the government seeks. This raises the issue of whether and how 
local government can be enabled and supported in this role especially 
in the context of the level of fiscal decentralisation evident in England. 
In addition, given the government’s emphasis upon decentralisastion 
beneath the level of local government, it raises the question of how 
such decentralisation processes unfold when focused upon the spatial 
scales of communities and neighbourhoods or at the level of individual 
citizens. Such issues require further investigation and synthesis and 
review of the available evidence.  
• If subjective well-being is emerging as a central focus of government 
policy then the evidence reported here suggests decentralisation could 
play a role its improvement. However, the nature and extent of 
decentralisation and the resources attached to it would seem to be 
critical in determining the chances of its success.  
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• Our findings suggest that increased fiscal – more than political – 
decentralisation should be considered given its positive association 
with lower levels of income inequality. Less well-off places in particular 
could benefit from the inequality-reducing effects of enhanced fiscal 
decentralisation. Moreover, consideration needs to be given to how 
further decentralisation might affect the high levels of inter-personal 
inequality evident within already highly decentralised and high income 
regions. 
• Given the claims being made for its potential impacts, more attention 
and clarity on the evaluation of the government’s strategy on 
decentralisation and localism will be beneficial. How, for example, will 
government know if its decentralisation and localism policies have 
achieved their aims? Given the potential for both positive and negative 
effects arising from decentralisation identified in this report, establishing 
robust frameworks and methods for the assessment of such policies is 
a central issue. 
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1 Introduction  
Decentralisation and localism are currently key themes in government policy. 
This study contributes evidence to the debate about decentralisation and 
localism. The government has embarked on a radical policy of 
decentralisation in England, which has been termed “localism”. 
Decentralisation from superior to lower tiers of government is a global trend 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). The government’s approach has a particular 
character in this context, however, in seeking decentralisation both to the very 
lowest tiers of government and away from government to the individual. The 
localism agenda is also linked to proposals aiming to increase the rate of local 
economic growth and debates about wellbeing which are becoming central to 
policy proposals in England. Moreover, it is a rapidly evolving agenda, the 
tenets of which are difficult to test rigorously and examine empirically. In 
principle, the government’s approach therefore represents a radical 
experiment with a particular form of decentralisation that has not been tried 
and tested elsewhere internationally.  
The current study aims to consider the international evidence about the 
impacts of decentralisation. It seeks systematically to identify the arguments 
concerning the social and economic impacts of decentralised forms of 
governance and articulate key questions of relevance to the policy debate. In 
Section 2 we outline the evolving policy context in relation to decentralisation 
and localism, including notions of the “Big Society”. This discussion is 
important insofar as it highlights the distinctiveness of the government’s 
agenda for England and the extent to which existing theories and evidence 
might usefully inform policy.  In Section 3 we review the literature on the 
impacts of decentralisation with a particular emphasis on its impact on the 
provision of local public services. The literature is essentially concerned with 
the redistribution of power and resources between tiers of government. It is 
more difficult to find literature and other evidence concerning the relationships 
between decentralisation, localism and the themes of the “Big Society”. The 
literature on decentralisation produces ambiguous and at times contradictory 
findings about its impacts on governance, public services, local growth and 
wellbeing. These are partly the result of data and methodological limitations, 
which beset all studies in this field, and also a product of the questions that 
tend to be asked. For instance, we find quite contradictory evidence about the 
impacts of decentralisation on the efficiency of local services, partly reflecting 
the difficulties in finding adequate means of measurement and data and the 
specific policy areas addressed. In addition, the literature on decentralisation 
tends, with one or two exceptions, not to draw strong distinctions between the 
efficacies of different tiers of sub-national government covering a variety of 
spatial scales, tending instead to explore the principle of decentralisation itself. 
We show that as an international phenomenon, decentralisation has adopted 
many forms and been enacted at different spatial scales. Thus, much of the 
international literature is concerned with decentralisation to the regional 
instead of — or as well as — the local scale and terms such as 
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decentralisation and devolution are used interchangeably1. The literature 
review and subsequent empirical analyses reveals the challenges of analysing 
these processes at the local scale. For these reasons we focus on assessing 
the evidence of the impacts of decentralisation more broadly defined, while 
attempting where possible to assess it in relation to the rapidly evolving policy 
agenda of localism in England. However, the report shows that such a focus 
provides evidence that has a strong bearing on government policy toward 
decentralisation in England. 
We explore these questions in some detail in Section 3 by examining 
comparative international data and then identify two issues – wellbeing and 
inequality – on which more light needs to be shed in the context of 
government policy toward decentralisation in England. In Section 4 we look at 
the relationship between decentralisation and subjective wellbeing. This shifts 
the focus away from the uncertain impacts of decentralisation on the efficiency 
of public services and instead onto the perceptions of citizens about 
decentralisation and its value to them. Here the analysis shows that, in broad 
terms, high degrees of decentralisation are associated with higher levels of 
subjective well-being among citizens. In Section 5 we address the relationship 
between fiscal and political decentralisation, income inequality and level of 
development. Here, the results of the analysis demonstrate that greater fiscal 
– more than political – decentralisation is associated with lower income 
inequality. In Section 6 we summarise our findings and highlight their 
relevance to the emerging government policy on decentralisation in England. 
 
                                                 
1  The international peer reviewed literature on “localism” and “government” is 
comparatively limited and much smaller than the literature on decentralisation. A search of 
Thomson Reuters ISI Web of Knowledge using these terms produced only 30 references, 
albeit covering a wide range of topics. In addition, there are few papers which address directly 
the impact of decentralisation and efficiency of local government directly. An exception is the 
study by Balaguer-Coll et al. (2009) of Spanish municipalities – see Section 3 below. It should 
be noted, however, that this concerns decentralisation from regional governments to 
municipalities rather from central to local government, so its direct relevance to UK debates is 
limited. 
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2 Policy context  
Decentralisation of government and governance is an international 
phenomenon. International organisations such as the World Bank, IMF, the 
OECD and the EU generally strongly support the decentralisation of power, 
authority and resources from the centre to lower tiers of government. The 
rationale is that this process meets multiple objectives of increasing the 
efficiency of public services, improving legitimacy and accountability of 
political institutions and fostering the growth of local economies (e.g. Burki, et 
al. 1999; World Bank, 2000; 2010; Ahmad, et al., 2008; OECD, 2001; for an 
important overview see Treisman, 2007: 1-21). Internationally, we can identify 
a widespread, if heterogeneous, trend toward decentralisation on the part of 
national governments. While globalisation is frequently cited as a factor 
encouraging governments to decentralise authority, along with the growing 
complexity of the state and growing demands upon it, the variation of patterns 
of decentralisation reflects the variety of motivations and national conditions 
(historical, political, economic) in which it has been introduced (e.g. 
Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). The factors that compel governments to 
decentralise power and resources – and the arguments they deploy in this 
cause – vary over time and between places (see Table 3.2 below for a 
typology of arguments). The varieties of forms and degress of decentralisation 
reflect different answers to the question of subsidiarity – that is, what is the 
lowest appropriate level to which a specific policy area should be 
decentralised. Claims about distinct territorial or political identities were an 
important motivation in early shifts toward more decentralised state structures, 
but latterly economic arguments have tended to be at the forefront 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Sandall, 2008) as governments search for a putative 
“economic dividend” from decentralisation in terms of efficiency gains and 
improved local growth (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; Pike et al., 2010). In 
this regard, governments and international organisations expect decentralised 
government to provide local services more efficiently and to have greater 
incentive to promote local economic growth.  
The government policy agenda in England focuses on the relationship 
between decentralisation, localism and the “Big Society” (HMG, 2010a). 
Localism, according to David Cameron, is founded on “the efficiency 
argument “, suggesting that more local delivery will improve the delivery of 
public services (quoted in HMG, 2010a: 4). Linked to this are concerns about 
promoting “Local Growth” as part of efforts to “rebalance” the UK economy in 
sectoral and spatial terms (HMG 2010b) and a concern with promoting 
wellbeing as a new and broader measure of development (Cameron, 2010). 
To some degree these agendas overlap and inform each other, while some 
commentators see contradictions and inconsistencies between these aspects. 
For instance, there is a great deal of confusion and contradiction in the 
commentary on decentralisation and localism, with the terms sometimes used 
interchangeably and on other occasions used to describe different processes 
(see Sear and Parry 2011 and Deloitte 2011 for a discussion of this issue). In 
practice this is an evolving policy agenda which makes it exceptionally difficult 
to predict its impacts.  
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One notable feature of the current policy agenda for England is that different 
forms of decentralisation are proposed for different policy fields such as 
education, health, economic development, etc. Arguably this will make it 
especially difficult to isolate and measure the contribution of decentralisation 
and multiply coordination problems2.  
The thinking underpinning the government’s decentralisation agenda for 
England is set out in its document Decentralisation and the Localism Bill: an 
essential guide (HMG, 2010a). Here decentralisation is the mechanism for 
transferring power from “Big Government” to “Big Society” – a process “giving 
people back to people and communities”, and a response to the fact that 
“centralisation has failed”. 
Figure 2.1 sets out the “six essential actions”, which compromise the 
decentralisation agenda. The document acknowledges the case against 
decentralisation, including claims about lack of local capacity, dangers of 
“nimbyism”, and the unequal provision and access to local services (the so-
called “post-code lottery”).  
In this context, the present study aims to bring evidence to bear on some of 
the key questions which surround this particular kind of decentralisation and 
localism, including shedding light on some of the relationships between 
different aspects of the emerging policy agenda. Section 3 examines the 
literature on decentralisation with a strong focus on the evidence for the Prime 
Minister’s claims about the efficiency argument. 
 
                                                 
2  In a contribution to the theory of federalism, Frey (2005) advocates an approach to 
decentralisation which is founded on a network of competing administrative units. Units of 
government, under this proposal, have four characteristics which are:  functional (where 
governmental units are extended over areas defined by the functions to be fulfilled); 
overlapping (where government units extending over different geographical areas); competing 
(where individuals choose to which governmental unit they belong for which function), and 
jurisdictional (the units of government have enforcement powers and the right to levy 
resources (FOCJ). The FOCJ approach might be considered to offer theoretical underpinning 
to the current UK policy agenda. It should be note, however, that Frey offers an entirely 
theoretical exercise. His empirical examples are drawn from the operation of the Hanseatic 
League from the 12–16th century and from contemporary USA and Switzerland. But, his 
example from the United States special districts highlights the extent to which these 
arrangements are designed to address special problems, rather than a general answer to 
problems of government. In practice, FOCJ can be criticised, like the New Public 
Management, for obscuring lines of political accountability for citizens, exacerbating rather 
than resolving problems of coordination and redistribution - arguments which Frey himself 
acknowledges.  
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Figure 2.1: The government’s approach to decentralisation in England 
 
 
Source: HMG 2010a 
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3 Literature review 
3.1 Types of decentralisation and measurement issues  
The process of state rescaling and its link to policy outcomes in terms of 
efficiency, growth, inequality, and political stability raises multidisciplinary 
interest ranging, for instance, from economics (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 2006) 
and  politics  (Loughlin, 2001; Keating et al., 2009) to geography (Jones et al., 
2005) and planning (Houghton, 2005). Analysis often conflates analysis with 
prescription in fields such as democracy (Drèze and Sen, 2002) and market 
reforms (Lobao et al., 2009).  
The process of rescaling of the state raises several methodological issues 
(Cohen and Peterson, 1996).  Indeed, the variety of approaches followed 
across different studies suggest “a startling diversity of definitions and 
measures to the decentralisation concept [so that] there is little agreement 
about what constitutes an example of decentralisation, what causes 
decentralisation, or what effects it is likely to have” (Schneider, 2003: 32,  33).  
Not only have different meanings been attributed to “decentralisation” 
(administrative, fiscal, political, spatial – see Table 3.1), but also many 
different terms are used in order to refer to changes involving the balance of 
power and competencies between central government and other actors both 
at sub-national and supra-national level within multi-level systems. A further 
concern is the initial starting point of the kinds and degrees of centralisation 
and/or decentralisation within particular countries and the respective size of 
the countries and their differing units of decentralised governance. As a result 
of these difficulties, conceptual confusion has often been the result (Treisman, 
2007).  
This lack of clarity makes it worth stressing differences related to these “de-
terms” (deconcentration, delegation, denationalisation, destatisation, and, 
devolution) both conceptually and methodologically (Brenner, 2009; Torrisi et 
al., 2010). To begin with, decentralisation is defined as “the transfer of 
authority and power from higher to lower levels of government or from national 
to subnational levels” (Rondinelli, et al. 1984; Collins and Green 1994; Mills, 
1994). Three main types of decentralisation have been considered in the 
literature: fiscal, administrative, and political (Treisman, 2007). Fiscal 
decentralisation refers to “the vertical government distribution of powers for 
raising and spending public resources” (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev 
2009). Administrative decentralisation takes into account decision-making 
authority, personnel control, and control over public finance (Treisman, 2002; 
Schneider, 2003); while political decentralisation refers to the degree of 
independence enjoyed by lower tiers of government in performing their typical 
six main processes (i.e. mobilisation, organisation, articulation, participation, 
contestation, and aggregation of interests). Deconcentration, delegation and 
devolution are forms of administrative decentralisation characterised by 
increasing degree of autonomy. Devolution, among the three types of 
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administrative decentralisation, is the one with the highest degree of 
autonomy assigned to lower-level receiving unit(s). 
Many different measures have been utilised in empirical studies as the proxies 
of concepts introduced above. For the sake of generalisation, fiscal 
decentralisation has been measured as simple or modified ratios of sub-
national government spending/revenue to general government respective 
datum (Martinez-Vazquez and Timofeev, 2009). Administrative 
decentralisation has been measured in terms of the degree of autonomy over 
executive appointment at different levels and the share of subnational 
governments in total government administration employees (Treisman 2002). 
Proxies for political decentralisation consist of some measure of the existence 
of elections at local level (Treisman, 2002; Schneider, 2003).  However, no 
single measure is able properly (and entirely) to capture the complexity of 
central-local relations reflecting each dimension of state activity.  Soft budget 
constraints (Kornai, 1979; Kornai et al., 2003; Oates, 2006), Baumol’s (1967) 
“disease”, and bureaucrats’ strategic behaviour (Migué and Bélanger, 1971; 
Breton and Wintrobe, 1975; Niskanen, 1975) are typical examples of issues 
involving empirical analysis in this field3.  In addition to measures looking only 
at the internal structure of the state, in order to take into account globalisation, 
the concepts of “denationalisation”, “destatisation”, and “internationalisation” 
have been utilised to refer to the “continuing movement of state power 
upwards, downwards, and sideways” (Jessop, 2002). Table 3.1 offers a 
synoptic view of concepts and measures utilised in the literature.  
 
The “Regional Authority” approach (Hooghe et al., 2008) represents an 
innovative and increasingly used method to encompass these different forms 
of decentralisation creating an unified methodology based on observable 
measures of self- rule and shared rule. Self-rule refers to the independence of 
a regional government from central control and to the scope of regional 
decision making and shared rule refers to the capacity of a regional 
government to shape central decision making (Elazar, 1987). In their paper 
Hooghe et al. (2008, p.123) ‘conceive regional authority in two domains. Self-
rule refers to the authority of a regional government over those living in the 
region. Shared rule refers to the authority a regional government  
(co-)exercises in the country as a whole. Each is measured along eight 
dimensions or scales which describe institutional alternatives’. More precisely, 
self-rule is operationalised as a numerical measure – ranging from 0 to 15 – 
resulting from regional government having an independent executive, the 
scope of its policy competencies, its capacity to tax, and the extent to which it 
has an independent legislature. As for shared rule, it is operationalised by 
dividing central government decision making process into four areas (normal 
legislation, executive policy, taxation, and constitutional reform) and assigning 
a numerical value - ranging from 0 to 9 – according to observed empirical 
situations. Regional Authority Index (RAI) represents the sum of the two 
indices ranging from 0 to 24. Overall, the Index is the strongest recent, 
systematic, internationally comparative and peer reviewed approach to 
                                                 
3  For a critical review dealing with defining and measuring decentralisation see Torrisi 
et al. (2010).     
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measuring degrees of decentralisation and by far the most robust available 
technique. It is therefore our preferred method of measuring decentralisation.  
Figure 3.1 reports the composite Regional Authority Index for a range of 
decentralised units in  countries of different sizes (Hooghe et al., 2008). We 
considered the issue of country size because it might have been that larger 
countries would be more positively disposed to decentralization in order to 
address regional and local issues more effectively. However, our empirical 
analysis shows that no statistically significant correlation arises between the 
two measures. The correlation coefficient is 0,472 which is mildly positive and 
expected but nothing that would generate statistical problems in the analysis.  
Figure 3.1. Regional Authority index relative to year 2006.  Source: authors’ elaboration 
on Hooghe et al. (2008) data4. 
 
 
                                                 
4  The Regional Authority index, as its name implies, focuses on the regional scale. We 
use it here as a rigorous – and influential - measure of sub-national decentralisation and are 
less concerned with the particular spatial scale at which it operates. 
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3.2 Benefits and costs resulting from the decentralisation of 
public service delivery  
The discourse concerning the positive and negative effects of decentralisation 
has been developed in a multidisciplinary way, according to different analytical 
frameworks which seek to highlight that decentralisation provides benefits and 
costs for the efficient provision of public services. The arguments for and 
against decentralisation are longstanding questions of political philosophy (see 
Table 3.2 for a typology of the arguments about decentralisation). The 
normative argument in favour of small administrative units as a form of political 
organisation of the state able to enhance democratic participation and citizens’ 
satisfaction can be traced back to de Montesquieu (1748: 140): 
In an extensive republic the public good is sacrificed to a thousand private 
views; it is subordinate to exceptions, and depends on accidents. In a 
small one, the interest of the public is more obvious, better understood, 
and more within the reach of every citizen; abuses have less extent, and of 
course are less protected. 
However, concerns about some possible harmful implications of 
decentralisation have been developed since at least 1787 when James Madison 
wrote: 
The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and 
interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more 
frequently will a majority be found of the same party; and the smaller the 
number of individuals composing a majority, and the smaller the compass 
within which they are placed, the more easily will they concert and execute 
their plans of oppression (Madison 1787: 63). 
Modern writers from a political economy perspective, notwithstanding caveats, 
favour decentralisation because it improves accountability and transparency. 
Decentralisation of public service delivery potentially resolves the inefficiencies 
generated by the separation of local spending from tax-raising decisions. In 
decentralised systems, local policy-makers are more closely connected to the 
local consequences of their spending decisions. In addition, decentralised 
delivery may open up opportunities for closer user involvement in more clearly 
articulating their needs and preferences and making and implementing 
decisions within their local area. Hence devolved administrations are able to 
tailor policies to local needs and stimulate participation and accountability by 
reducing the distance between those in government and their constituencies 
(Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005; Balaguer-Coll et al. 2010). This allows for an 
efficient match of public services to local demand. Decentralisation generally 
adds to the success of democracy which is the most valued institutional means 
of creating political accountability (Weingast 2009). Accountability also 
contributes to social cohesion, because if local vested interests are powerful, in 
the absence of local political accountability, decentralisation could increase 
social fragmentation (e.g. Bradhan and Mookherjee, 1998; Neyapti, 2006). 
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Table 3.2 Arguments for and against decentralisation (adapted from Treisman, 2007: 12-15; 270-
294; Pike et al, 2010: 23) 
For  
1. Administrative efficiency. Multi-tier government makes it possible to satisfy citizens’ demands for 
public goods and service more precisely and cost-effectively (e.g. Oates, Montesquieu). 
Critique: Only administrative – not political – decentralisation is required for this outcome. 
2. Local competition. Competition among local governments to attract mobile residents or investment 
induces them to be more honest, efficient and responsive (e.g. Hayek, Tiebout). 
Critique: The conditions for local competition will rarely be met in most countries and, in any event, may 
lead to perverse outcomes (e.g. “race to the bottom” tax reduction and public provision competition).  
3. Fiscal incentives. Increasing local governments’ share in a shared tax should increase their motivation 
to support local economic activity, resulting in better performance nationwide (e.g. Oates). 
Critique: Increasing local governments’ share means decreasing the shares of other levels of government. 
4. Democracy. Decentralisation, by reducing the scale of government increases citizen participation and 
cultivates civic virtue and enhances electoral accountability because citizens are more informed about 
local issues (e.g. Tocqueville, J.S. Mill, Jefferson). 
Critique: Local government can cultivate corruption as well as virtue and are not necessarily any better 
informed about local as opposed to national issues. 
5. Checks, balances and liberty. In decentralised systems, strong local government will check 
government abuses and protect against central government abuse (e.g. Tocqueville, Madison, Hamilton).  
Critique: Central governments can pursue divide and conquer mechanisms while local government may 
use their powers to protect local abuses (e.g. slavery). 
6. Veto players and change. By making policy changes depend on more actors, decentralisation tends to 
increase policy stability (e.g. Proudhon, Hume). 
Critique: Can lead to the entrenchment of bad policies and lack of incentive for innovation. 
7. Local information and policy innovation. Local governments are able make better use of local 
information, which can lead to policy innovation (e.g. Turgot, Brandeis, J.S. Mill) 
Critique: Local governments are not necessarily adept at eliciting local information, while central 
government can make more use of policy innovations. 
8. Ethnic conflicts. Political decentralisation defuses ethnic conflicts by satisfying demand for local 
autonomy. 
Critique: Political decentralisation may equally entrench such conflicts. 
Against 
1. Fiscal pressures. Politically strong local governments undermine fiscal and macroeconomic discipline 
by exploiting “soft budget constraints” to extract central government transfers (Kornai)  
Critique: These are more a function of weak central government than strong local governments. 
2. Fiscal coordination. When local governments and central governments can independently tax the 
same base or are expected by voters to spend on the same services, leading to problems of over-taxing or 
over-spending. 
Critique: Pressures to overtax and overspend may offset each other. 
3. Inequality. Decentralised systems empower strong places at the expense of weaker ones 
Critique: Fiscal equalisation measures can mitigate spatial inequality (McLean) 
4. Additional administrative costs. Multiple layers of government multiply the costs of government 
(Treisman) 
Critique: Decentralisation reveals the costs of government to citizens. 
5. Decentralisation leads to wasteful zero-sum competition.  
Decentralised units generate duplication and waste through individualised rent seeking behaviour 
(Scitovsky) 
Critique: national or international competition rules can limit this 
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a 
b 
d 
e 
c
Price, Cost 
Quantity 
D2
D1 
Dcentr
Q1 Qcen Q2 
AC
 
From an economic perspective the discourse is centred on Pareto-efficiency. 
Indeed, after Tiebout (1956), the benefits of decentralisation could be measured 
in terms of user satisfaction. Understanding and meeting the local preferences 
of users in efficient, flexible and responsive ways can be facilitated by 
decentralised service delivery systems. The principle of subsidiarity is relevant 
here in seeking to decentralise decision making to the lowest appropriate level. 
Cost efficiency can be improved through allocative efficiencies in resource 
distribution and user satisfaction can be enhanced through more appropriate, 
even ‘personalised’, and accountable public services. Overall, in the Tiebout 
model, horizontal government competition is likely to lead to efficiency in the 
local public sector (Epple and Nechyba, 2004). However, population mobility is 
the central mechanism in this model. 
Oates (1972) provides a stylised formal analytical model to address this issue, 
in terms of consumers’ surplus without the strict assumption of mobility of 
households. In order to explain the benefit of decentralisation his model 
assumes that the national community is composed of two geographical 
jurisdictions (1, 2) with different preferences between them concerning their 
optimal quantity of public good and perfectly homogenous preferences within. 
Under the assumption of (i) no external effects between jurisdictions and (ii) a 
production function of the public good characterised by Constant Returns to 
Scale (CRS) the economic decision-making process concerning the production 
of the public goods could be represented by Figure 3.3.  Here the demand 
curve for the public good of jurisdiction 1, 2 and the aggregate demand arising 
from the centralised solution are represented respectively by D1, D2, and Dcentr. 
In our example jurisdiction 2 has a strong preference for the public good 
showing a demand curve higher than the jurisdiction 1 demand curve for each 
price. AC represents the average cost for the provision of the public good. 
Figure 3.3. Decentralisation Theorem 
                                                                                 
 
 
 
 
Consequently Q1, Q2, would be the quantity produced, at a price equal to the 
average cost AC, respectively by the first jurisdiction and the second jurisdiction 
under decentralisation – i.e. if they would be able to set their own preferred 
quantity of public good provision – and an intermediate quantity, say Qcentr, 
would be the quantity produced under a centralised setting. The crucial point is 
that the centralised solution is unable exactly to satisfy neither jurisdiction 1 nor 
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jurisdiction 2’s specific preferences. In particular, jurisdiction 1 would increase 
its welfare by a reduction of the production of public good while jurisdiction 2 
would increase its welfare by augmenting the public good provision with respect 
to the centralised solution. From a strictly microeconomic perspective the 
situation described in Figure 3.3 could be interpreted in terms of product 
differentiation (Hotelling, 1929). Indeed, the variable of choice rather than 
reflecting simply the quantity of good could reflect a quality dimension of such a 
good in order to take into account that “it seems that the quality component of 
the choice bears as much on the outcome of the choice as its quantity 
component. Sometimes, it even happens that only the quality component plays 
a role” (Gabszewicz and Thisse, 1979). For instance, let us assume that the 
Graph 1 refers to elderly care service. In this case D2 could reflect a “mature” 
jurisdiction (i.e. with a relative majority of voters constituted by older people) 
that would presumably prefer better services in elderly care rather than in 
schools. This does not vary the number of people served and does not 
necessarily vary the absolute value of the quantity of goods or services 
produced. However, this does increase spending in this field as more “units” of 
a certain quality measure will be produced. The example could be easily 
extended to D2 being a “green” jurisdiction with respect for example to waste 
collection and environmental services, and so on. The point is that, from a non-
paternalistic perspective, in any case of heterogeneous preferences the 
differentiation of sellers implies a potential welfare gain represented by the sum 
of the area of the triangle abc, in which the subjective evaluation of jurisdiction 1 
is lower than the price, and the area of the triangle cde characterised by a 
subjective evaluation higher than the price. The general economic claim in 
favour of decentralisation based on the framework illustrated in Graph 1, is 
summarised in the so called “decentralisation theorem” formulated by Oates 
(1972:  35): 
For a public good–the consumption of which is defined over geographical 
subsets of the total population, and for which the costs of providing each 
level of output of the good in each jurisdiction are the same for the central 
or for the respective local government–it will always be more efficient (or at 
at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the Pareto-efficient 
levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central 
government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all 
jurisdictions. 
This theory of decentralisation demonstrates how, depending upon a range of 
assumptions, decentralised institutional arrangements are able to deliver 
greater overall economic welfare in comparison to more centralised systems.  
 
According to the “decentralisation theorem”, there is a trade off between 
efficient internalisation of inter-jurisdictional spillovers through centralisation and 
efficient matching of local policies to local tastes through decentralisation (Epple 
and Nechyba, 2004). If there are no economies of scale associated with 
centralised provision, then a decentralised pattern of public outputs reflecting 
differences in tastes across jurisdictions will be welfare enhancing (Oates, 
2006). In other words, decentralisation emerges as optimal if spillovers are 
sufficiently small and centralisation, despite political distortions, becomes 
optimal as spillovers grow (Besley and Coate, 1999; Epple and Nechyba, 2004). 
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In addition to the quantity/quality issue, from a broader perspective, 
decentralisation could enhance the capacity to address particular local 
circumstances in the sense that decentralisation enables public policy and 
service delivery to reflect geographical differences more effectively than 
centrally determined approaches. Research has established the importance of 
place-based effects (e.g. peer effects, neighbourhood and intergenerational 
effects) that significantly influence public policy and service outcomes 
(Department for Communities and Local Government, 2007). Decentralisation 
of public service delivery provides the potential for greater context sensitivity in 
addressing such place-based effects, adapting broader policy and service 
approaches, managing differences in services and their potential for 
improvement between places and contributing to the identification of which 
spatial levels are the most appropriate for specific kinds of policy and service 
delivery. In addition, ‘the provision of public services should be located at the 
lowest level of government encompassing, in a spatial sense, the relevant 
benefits and costs’ (Oates, 1999: 1122). In line with this argument, more 
recently, the ‘New Public Management’ literature emphasises the importance of 
decentralisation in connecting service producers and users, enhancing the 
responsiveness of services to meet the differentiated choices and rising 
expectations of users, and improving the efficiency of resource allocation 
(Tomaney et al., 2009). 
 
Moreover, decentralisation could encourage creativity and innovation. 
Decentralisation enhances autonomy and empowers regional and local actors 
with the responsibility, resources and decision-making powers to address 
regional and local policy and service delivery issues. Therefore, in addition to 
better locally targeted policies potentially applicable and known to the whole set 
of jurisdictions, experimentation and innovation in public service delivery might 
result as different places try to find solutions through different approaches in 
different policy areas5. In addition, the devolved administrations’ ability to tailor 
policies to local needs generates innovation in service provision through inter-
territorial competition (Rodríguez-Pose and Gill, 2005). Competition, in turn, 
gives sub-national governments the incentive to foster local economic 
prosperity and to promote the development of local markets (Weingast, 2009). 
Moreover, decentralisation gives sub-national governments an incentive to 
produce public goods and services more efficiently by creating inter-
jurisdictional competition for residents and economic activity through making 
use of local resources, knowledge and capacities (Rodríguez-Pose and 
Tijmstra2009: 2044). In a decentralised system, economically less developed 
regions, for instance, may offer more attractive investment conditions, such as 
more flexible labour markets or lower tax rates (Lessmann, 2009). The 
                                                 
5  This idea is expressed in Louis Brandeis’ seminal dissenting US Supreme Court 
judgement “It is one of the happy accidents of the federal system that a single courageous state 
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory, and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country”, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 
262, 311 (1932). This statement stimulated a whole branch of American political science. See 
the classic article by Walker (1969). 
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investments they attract may help poor regions to catch up with richer ones with 
less centrally mandated redistribution (Lessmann, 2009). 
A further positive implication of decentralisation arises in terms of better co-
ordination of regional and/or local agents. Decentralised provision of public 
services and goods can facilitate and encourage the closer relationships and 
dialogue helpful to co-ordination and integration amongst multiple regional and 
local agents involved the administration and delivery of public services. As 
service delivery seeks efficiencies through connecting a wider array of agents in 
integrated (or ‘joined-up’) approaches to cross-cutting problems, 
decentralisation can provide practical ways of making this happen. In addition, 
central government coordination can improve on decentralised outcomes when 
local public goods and services, such as education, public safety or public 
infrastructure are provided by overlapping local jurisdictions (Epple and 
Nechyba, 2004). 
Nonetheless, the literature on decentralisation notes negative effects or “costs” 
potentially linked to the decentralisation process. As already mentioned, from a 
political perspective, the counterpart of transparency and involvement is 
represented by parochialism, insularity and institutional capture. Decentralised 
public service delivery systems can promote inward-looking approaches and 
outlooks that focus exclusively upon local priorities. Opportunities to learn from 
innovation elsewhere in the system or to address cross-boundary issues such 
as skills and transport may be stymied as a result. Unproductive and wasteful 
competition for resources may also be encouraged. Such issues might be 
particular problems in highly decentralised systems with only limited or loose 
ties and/or regulation through broader regional and/or national structures. In 
addition, decentralised systems open to local user involvement may risk the 
impact of sectional interests exerting undue influence and distorting local 
decision making. 
From the economic perspective, decentralisation could fail if, for example, the 
production of public goods could be characterised by sub-additive cost function 
and scale economies. Therefore, decentralised systems can risk duplicating 
effort and resources which undermines the potential scale economies and cost 
efficiencies available through larger scale service delivery. Hence, the cost 
efficiency and economic viability of decentralised services may be compromised 
through the limited demand generated by lower levels of population within 
smaller catchment areas. Service standards and consistency may also be 
uneven between different areas as smaller scale and different approaches are 
pursued in different places. 
Although geographically differentiated provision of public goods – based on 
heterogeneous preferences between local jurisdictions – is seen as a welfare-
enhancing factor, such unevenness and differences in service delivery raise 
challenges for managing, planning and improving public services that contribute 
to social and spatial disparities because people’s access to public services is 
determined by the area in which they live (often described as the “postcode 
lottery”). A key issue here is whether the same services in different places are 
delivered at the same or different levels of cost efficiency and with the same or 
different levels of user satisfaction. In other words, in addition to the productive 
efficiency mentioned above, the diversity of preferences within a jurisdiction is a 
crucial issue in order to obtain the efficiency gain based on users’ surplus. 
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Moreover, resource constraints could ‘condemn’ poorer jurisdictions to lower 
levels of services regardless of their preferences generating regressive 
phenomena such as “red-lining” and the stigmatisation of places.  
In addition to financial resources local jurisdictions could suffer a lack of 
capacity and specialised knowledge.  Decentralised delivery systems can 
struggle to organise and build capacity to take good decisions and to provide 
specialised services which require high levels of technical competence and/or 
sophisticated equipment. For instance, fiscal decentralisation may weaken the 
capacity of central government to reduce spatial disparities (Ezcurra and 
Pascual, 2008). A central public sector may generate a more balanced 
distribution of income by channelling resources from richer regions to poorer 
ones (Prud’homme, 1995).  
Figure 3.3 shows the dynamic of potential benefits and costs of decentralisation 
for the provision of public goods and indicates that the nature and extent of 
decentralisation will shape the quantity and quality of public goods which affect 
the performance of local economies. Figure 3.3 demonstrates that 
decentralisation can have both positive and negative effects on the set of 
characteristics (quantity and quality) of inputs which, in addition to the direct 
effect of decentralisation, determines (and is itself determined by)  the 
performance of local government. On the on hand, potential negative effects 
arising from devolution are linked with (i) enhanced lobbies’ ability to capture 
policy-makers and bureaucrats at local level and with the potentially (ii) lower 
level of skills of the latter at the local level. Further, strictly economic factors 
such as the (iv) missed exploitation of potential economies of scale due to the 
lack of a critical mass at lower (local) level of activity and the (v) lack of co-
ordination in addressing externalities issues could also result in a Pareto-
inefficient outcome in the provision of public goods. On the other hand, (a) 
better political accountability of local policy-makers and bureaucrats and 
consequent (b) improved political and technical responsibility, accompanied 
with their (c) better knowledge of the local resources and issues and the relative 
(c) easier innovation (both of process and product) could have considerable 
efficiency-enhancing effects. Therefore, the net effect depends upon the 
balance amongst multiple factors and, as a result, is rather case-specific and 
cannot be determined ex ante.  
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Figure 3.3. Dynamic of potential benefits and costs of decentralisation for the provision 
of public goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.4 Decentralisation and public service efficiency: some empirical 
evidence 
Although theoretical arguments highlight that decentralisation represents both a 
resource and a threat for local government and for the economic performance 
of the system as a whole, the discourse on its positive effects has generated a 
global trend towards greater decentralisation in order to achieve greater growth 
and efficiency (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010).  Despite this global trend, 
the empirical analysis does not unambiguously corroborate the claims of a 
positive effect of decentralisation on economic performance.   
In a recent paper regarding the Italian case, Boetti et al. (2010) utilising both 
parametric (stochastic method) and non-parametric (DEA) approaches 
performed an analysis on the spending efficiency of 262 Italian municipalities 
considering four outputs (number of served inhabitants, amounts of waste 
collected, length of municipal road, and number of pupils and old people) 
generated by four different categories of public current expenditure (general 
administration, waste management, road maintenance and local mobility, and 
education and elderly care) for the year 2005. According to both techniques, 
local governments that enjoy a higher level of decentralisation (measured as 
revenue share) show a higher level of spending efficiency. In other words, 
consistent with modern fiscal federalism theories, decentralisation seems to be 
an efficiency enhancing factor. Barankay and Lockwood (2007) examine the 
impact of decentralisation and the productive efficiency of government using 
evidence from Swiss cantons and show robust relationships between 
decentralisation and higher educational achievement. 
More inconclusive findings are identified by Balaguer-Coll, et al. (2009) with 
respect to the Spanish case. Adopting a two-stage approach , in their study 
regarding a sample of municipalities with a population over 1,000 inhabitants for 
the years 1995 and 2000 they consider eight outputs (population, number of 
streetlights, waste collected, street infrastructure surface areas, public buildings 
Quantity & Quality 
of inputs 
Local performance 
 
Decentralisation Lobbies, bureaucrats’ skills, 
economies of scale (critical 
mass), externalities 
Accountability, 
responsibility, knowledge, 
preferences, innovation 
(+) (‐) 
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surface area, surface area (Lonjas), registered surface area of public parks, and 
assistance centre surface area) generated by five inputs (wages and salaries, 
expenditure on goods and services, current transfers, capital expenditure, and 
capital transfers). The authors conclude that they “cannot provide a clear-cut 
answer as to whether enhanced decentralisation, or enhanced centralization, is 
‘good’ or ‘bad’ in terms of efficiency” (Balaguer-Coll et al., 2009, p. 27). Indeed, 
their results do show evidence of efficiency gains generated by enhanced 
decentralisation (decentralisation economies) increasing over time, but this 
conclusion cannot be generalised to their whole sample. 
Moreover, Freinkman and Plekhanov (2009) distinguish between the effects of 
decentralisation on inputs from the effects on outputs and find that there is no 
significant effect on key inputs into secondary education and utility provision 
(e.g. schools, computers, or availability of pre-schooling) but decentralisation 
has a significant positive effect on average examination results (a proxy for 
education output) and on the quality of municipal utilities provision measured in 
terms of reliability. The authors interpret this evidence as consistent with the 
accountability and incentives argument in favour of decentralisation in the sense 
that as a result of the lack of incentives on local officials to improve the quality 
of public services, often process-oriented solutions are introduced, making local 
officials accountable for centrally observed inputs such as student-teacher 
ratios or hospital beds per head. Therefore, local units, also benefiting from 
inter-jurisdictional input-equalising grants, would put effort into achieving these 
targets regardless of decentralisation and citizens’ preferences. However, once 
the outcome is considered, decentralisation has a role to play in influencing 
results indirectly monitored by central government in a way that decentralised 
settings will be more efficient than centralised ones. 
Focusing on this idea of central targets assigned to local governments, Revelli 
(2009) explores the link between fulfilment of central expenditure targets and 
English local government performance. This paper utilises as its performance 
measures of 150 English local authorities that are responsible for bulk of local 
public expenditure contained in the Comprehensive Performance Assessment 
system (CPA)6 covering five main areas (services to children and young people; 
social care services to adults, elderly and mentally ill people; housing services; 
environmental services; culture) for the years 2002 to 2007. The author finds 
empirical evidence that local public expenditures in excess of centrally set 
spending standards have a detrimental effect on performance. This evidence, 
even if not directly linked to the decentralisation issue, could be interpreted as 
consistent with a negative effect of decentralisation in the sense that it indicates 
that if a local body, differentiating its spending behaviour, deviates its actual 
spending decision from a centrally set spending standard, a lower level of 
efficiency will obtain. Nonetheless, Andrews and Martin (2007) in a study 
comparing England to Welsh performance indicators, covering a range of 
services, show that the decentralised Welsh approach has not yet delivered 
significantly better performance in public services to that achieved in 
comparable areas of England. Moreover, in many cases services in Wales have 
performed less well and improved more slowly, although it is unclear whether 
                                                 
6  Due to the nature of the CPA system which essentially consists of qualitative ranking 
measures ranging assuming value “poor”, “weak”, “fair”, “good” and  “excellent”, the paper adopt 
an ordered response probit model.   
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this study reveals more about the context in Wales than the principle of 
decentralisation. 
From a more general perspective, an aggregate study performed by Rodríguez-
Pose and Ezcurra (2010), analysed the effects of three different types of 
decentralisation (fiscal, administrative and political) on economic growth 
analysing 21 OECD countries between 1990 and 2005. Their study finds a 
negative and robust effect of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth. As for 
administrative decentralisation, a further negative effect on growth is found even 
if it is weaker and less robust than the one relative to fiscal decentralisation. 
Finally, with respect to political decentralisation the impact does not appear 
robust because of the sensitivity to the proxy used to measure it. When 
Schneider’s (2003) index is used, the degree of political decentralisation shows 
a positive influence on economic growth, while using Hooghe at al.’s (2008) 
index its impact is marginally negative and significant when controlling for the 
fiscal decentralisation of current expenditures. However, if capital expenditures 
are considered its effect remains still negative but not significant. Therefore, this 
study argues that “the potential economic benefits of fiscal decentralization in 
terms of economic performance are more than counterweighed by the potential 
economic pitfalls of transferring ever greater resources to sub-national tiers of 
government” (Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra, 2010: 25). Clearly these kinds of 
study analyse in an indirect way the link between decentralisation and efficiency, 
in the sense that should decentralisation improve the quality of public services, 
this will result in higher growth via the systemic link between infrastructure and 
growth. 
Nonetheless, with a more specific attention paid to the efficiency issue, but 
sharing the same macroeconomic definition of efficiency outputs, Adam et al. 
(2008) in a study of 21 OECD countries between 1970 and 2000 found a 
positive and robust effect of decentralisation on efficiency measured using two 
output measures; namely the Economic Performance Indicator (EPI) and the 
Economic Stability Indicator (ESI)7. Indeed, their study, augmenting the relevant 
non-parametric literature on efficiency (see e.g. Afonso et al., 2005) with the 
regression analysis of the effect of decentralisation, shows that DEA efficiency 
scores are positively affected by fiscal decentralisation. This result is robust 
according to different proxies of decentralisation based both on the revenue and 
on expenditure grounds. 
Therefore, it could be argued that the empirical relationship between 
decentralisation and efficiency, although generally supporting the positive link 
between decentralisation and economic efficiency, also reveals cases of 
negative effects.  This finding supports the idea that results are sensitive both to 
socio-economic contexts and to estimation techniques. 
3.5 Conclusion and assessment 
This section has reviewed the conceptual and methodological issues in defining 
and measuring decentralisation and efficiency and the relationships between 
them. The empirical evidence is mixed, reporting both positive and negative 
outcomes often reflecting different contexts and estimation techniques as well 
                                                 
7  EPI is composed by unemployment rate, GDP per capita, and annual GDP growth rate, 
while ESI is composed by standard deviation of the GDP growth rate and by the inflation rate. 
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as the different policy areas addressed. Many of these studies seek to measure 
objective indicators (waste collected, length of municipal road, public building, 
etc.) without controlling for the quality of outputs – an exception being Revelli’s 
(2009) use of the CPA (a comprehensive measure of local performance 
developed by UK Audit Commission), although this measure does not allow us 
to know whether decentralisation successfully responds to citizens’ 
heterogeneous local preferences. Decentralisation is justified first and foremost 
as improving the efficient delivery of public policies. We have demonstrated the 
difficulty of establishing a consistent and robust link between decentralised 
government the efficiency of public services. Reviewing the arguments Hooghe 
and Marks conclude: 
The structure of subnational government hangs on the size of the state, 
which is the outcome of historical forces that have little to do with 
efficiency and a lot to do with distributional geopolitical conflict. Moreover, 
in some states, regional units have histories as independent polities and 
resist being marshalled by the drum of efficiency (2009: 238). 
In this context, a more fruitful line of inquiry may be to assess whether in 
general citizens’ are most satisfied with services under decentralised systems of 
government. Yet, whether decentralisation yields more or less satisfaction with 
government and public policies has been overlooked by the literature. No study 
so far has addressed whether decentralisation leads to greater individual 
satisfaction with aspects that are directly related to the effectiveness, or lack of 
it, of the policies implemented by decentralised systems. This represents an 
omission given the growing government policy concern with wellbeing as the 
focus for public policy.  It is this set of questions that the rest of this report 
addresses.  There is an opportunity to analyse the link between decentralisation 
and efficiency taking into account citizens’ preferences and satisfaction, which 
represents two pivotal issues in relation to public and goods and services 
affected by the decentralisation process. In addition, decentralisation of powers 
and resources to lower tiers of government can – under different circumstances 
and in different contexts – contribute to both increase and reduce interpersonal 
inequalities. Whether decentralisation is good or bad for inter-personal 
inequality may be highly dependent upon the level of development of a territory. 
These issues enter the debates in the concerns about “postcode lottery” effects 
of decentralisation. Behind the latter is the implication that disadvantaged 
places lack the capacity to derive putative benefits from decentralisation. The 
following sections shed light on these important questions. 
A further, and important, point needs to be made here. Both the analysis of well-
being and the relationship between decentralisation, inequality and growth 
presented in the following sections, focus on the impacts on individuals. The 
impact of decentralisation on individuals has been almost completely 
overlooked by the literature, which tends to focus instead on its impacts within 
specific territories (mainly at regional scale – see above.) Our analysis is 
innovative insofar as we focus on the impacts of decentralisation on individuals 
and this connects with that aspect of current government policy toward 
decentralisation in England. 
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4 Decentralisation and wellbeing  
4.1 Introduction 
We noted above that in the context of the difficulty of finding robust evidence for 
the impact of decentralisation on the efficiency of public services and suggested 
that a more fruitful approach maybe be to attempt to assess its impact on 
citizen’s perceptions of their wellbeing.  There is an important and emerging 
literature on the subjective well-being (SWB) of individuals, which has strongly 
influenced national policy debates (see Cameron 2010)8. This literature tends to 
assume the importance of well-functioning institutions in the promotion of SWB, 
although there are few studies which look at the relationship between 
decentralisation and SWB (exceptions include Frey and Stutzer, 2000; 
Bjørnskov et al., 2008a; Voigt and Blume, 2009). To date, we are not aware of 
any study which has directly addressed whether decentralisation leads to 
greater individual satisfaction with aspects directly related to the effectiveness, 
or otherwise, of policies implemented by decentralised governments. 
 
4.2 Decentralisation and subjective well-being 
Much of the interest in decentralisation has been centred on the economic 
implications of the transfer of powers and resources to sub-national 
governments. In general, macroeconomic studies have been used to address 
whether decentralisation has contributed to greater economic efficiency or 
resulted in more or less territorial inequality. Microeconomic studies have 
looked at the impact of decentralisation on poverty and interpersonal inequality 
and social capital. Macroeconomic studies have focused on income, 
unemployment and inflation. Often inconclusive, such studies may also overlook 
the extent to which decentralisation is primarily about improving the delivery of 
public services to individuals in ways which more closely meet their needs and 
wants and lead them to be more satisfied with their provisions by government. 
This issue, however, is strangely neglected in the literature.  
Bjørnskov et al (2008: 140a) note that arguments about whether local autonomy 
leads to greater satisfaction with public policies, in particular, and political 
institutions, in general, are closely linked to arguments for and against 
decentralisation more broadly. In its favour is the “fiscal decentralization 
theorem” (Tiebout, 1956; Klugman, 2004) discussed above, which suggests that 
local governments have a greater potential to tailor their specific policies to the 
needs of citizens in ways that produce greater satisfaction levels. Moreover, 
decentralisation engenders greater local competition producing efficiency gains 
and increased accountability and transparency. Critics doubt whether individual 
needs and wants vary much between localities; suggest some local authorities 
will lack the capacity to act effectively and are concerned about the dangers of 
                                                 
8  For a fuller treatment of these issues and further details on the research methodology, 
including the econometric specification, data and variables, are contained in Diaz-Serrano and 
Rodríguez-Pose (2011). 
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increasing inequality in decentralised governance systems (see Prud’homme, 
1995 for a widely cited analysis of “the dangers of decentralization”)9. 
 
4.2 Research methodology 
In order to determine whether the aspects linked to decentralisation leading to a 
greater or lower citizens’ satisfaction prevail, the analysis examines how cross-
country differences in political and fiscal decentralisation (key independent 
variables) affect  the level of satisfaction of individuals with democracy, 
government, the economic situation, the education and health systems, and 
their overall levels of happiness (dependent variables). While in any regression 
analysis the issue of causation is bound to be thorny, in happiness and 
subjective well-being research scholars have traditionally approached the 
question by asking themselves whether happy or more satisfied citizens would 
choose, in the case of this report, a decentralised system, while unhappy ones 
would prefer a centralised one (Bjørnskov et al., 2010). Given the larger stability 
of decentralised institutions over time – even in a period of a drive towards 
devolution such as the 1990s – than of the happiness and satisfaction indices 
used in the report, the possibility of reverse causality is extremely unlikely, 
suggesting as stated by previous research into this type of analysis (e.g. Frey 
and Stutzer, 2000; Dorn et al., 2008) that “causality runs unambiguously from 
direct democratic rights to satisfaction with life” (Frey and Stutzer, 2000, p. 927). 
In addition, by introducing a fixed effects estimation which includes not only 
specific  country effects, but also specific country-time effects in order to control 
for unobserved heterogeneity across countries and time-periods, the fact that 
decentralisation factor scores are robust, limits any potential biases linked to 
endogeneity and omitted variables (see also Bjørnskov et al. 2010). 
 
The dependent variables stem from the four waves of the European Social 
Survey (ESS) that have been made available. This biennial cross-national 
survey aims to create a standard of methodology for cross-national attitude 
surveys. Its main focus are people’s attitudes and underlying values, but it also 
contains a number of social background variables of individuals, as well as their 
partners and parents. The available survey years are 2002, 2004, 2006 and 
2008, and the geographic coverage is at European level. In order to maximise 
the number of observations by country and across different time periods, we 
pool the four available waves of the ESS.  
The ESS consists of regular ‘rounds’ of data collection, with each round 
involving an independent cross-sectional sample in each nation. The target 
population for each participating nation is defined as all adults (15 years or 
older) resident in households within the borders of the nation, regardless of 
nationality or citizenship. The geographic coverage in the four available waves 
refers to 30 countries, mostly European.  
One of the most important features of the ESS questionnaire is that it contains 
both fixed and rotating elements. In the rotating part of the questionnaire, every 
                                                 
9  See  Section 2  for  a discussion of how  these  claims have been expressed  in  current national 
policy debates. 
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wave includes two specific topics that can change from wave to wave. The fixed 
part consists of questions that are included in every ESS-wave. This module 
includes some basic socio-economic and demographic background information, 
but also some questions regarding respondents’ satisfaction in different 
domains. We use these variables to measure the impact of government 
decentralisation on individual’s subjective well-being. More specifically our 
outcome variables regard the following satisfaction domains: happiness, 
present state of the economy, satisfaction with government and satisfaction with 
democracy, state of education and state of health services. Elicited individuals’ 
responses are based on an eleven-point scale where 0 means extremely 
bad/dissatisfied and 10 means extremely good/satisfied. In Table 4.3 we show a 
summary statistics of the satisfaction variables used in the study. Since the 
variable collecting the degree of individual’s happiness refers to the same 
concept than individual’s life satisfaction, we will only use the first as an 
indicator of the level of individual’s subjective well-being (SWB).  
Regarding our SWB indicator, i.e. happiness, we observe that the five Nordic 
countries are the ones reporting the highest levels of SWB. There are a small 
number of countries reporting a very low level of SWB, i.e. average scores 
below seven. These countries are in Southern (with the exception of Spain) and 
Eastern Europe. Looking at the remaining of the satisfaction domains regarding 
government and institutions, we can distinguish three groups of countries.  One 
group made of countries where their citizens exhibit a high degree of 
satisfaction with institutions. This group includes, once again, the Nordic and 
Western European countries. In the negative extreme, we find Eastern 
European countries plus Portugal.    
Following the theoretical discussion in Section 3 the decentralisation variables 
are divided, into political and fiscal decentralisation variables. They stem from 
two different sources. Political decentralisation indicators are taken from 
Hooghe et al.’s (2008) Regional Authority Index (RAI). The data covers 42 
countries for the period 1950-2006 (Table 4.1). The Regional authority index 
(RAI) is measured along eight dimensions, i.e. this index results as the 
combination of different aspects of decentralisation. 
In addition to Hooghe et al.’s (2008) data, specific data on fiscal decentralisation 
are used. This data consists of indicators calculated as the ratio between sub-
national and general economic magnitudes. These are yearly indicators 
covering the period 1972-2005. The source of these variables is the 
Government Finance Statistics of the International Monetary Fund. We use five 
indicators covering the following five economic variables: expenditure, current 
expenditure, capital expenditure, revenues/grants and tax revenues.  
In order to test the impact of decentralisation on individual’s subjective well-
being (SWB), we match the ESS with the decentralisation variables. All 
individuals surveyed in the ESS and residing in the same country have 
assigned the same value of the corresponding decentralisation index. Since the 
individual data used here is a pool the four waves of the ESS, the 
decentralisation variables vary not only by country but also by wave. For 
instance, for the UK in the 2002 wave, we assign the time-average of a given 
decentralisation measure from the first available year of the measure from to 
2001. For the 2004 and 2006 waves, we assign the same time-average 
extended to 2003 and 2005, respectively. For the 2008 wave, each country is 
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assigned the same values of the decentralisation indicators as in 2006, because 
the latest available years for our decentralisation measures are 2005 and 2006 
for the fiscal decentralisation and the RAI dataset, respectively.  
According to the RAI index (Table 4.0), the top five of decentralised countries 
are Germany, Belgium, Spain, Switzerland, and Austria . At the bottom of the 
ranking we find small countries as Iceland, Luxembourg, Estonia, Cyprus, and 
Bulgaria. The specific fiscal decentralisation measures provide the following 
ranking: the top five is composed now by Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, 
Sweden and Finland, while at the bottom of this ranking we find Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Israel, and Portugal10. 
In order to determine whether the aspects linked to decentralisation lead to a 
greater or lower citizens’ satisfaction, our analysis examines how cross-country 
differences in political and fiscal decentralisation (key independent variables) 
affect the level of satisfaction of individuals with democracy, government, the 
economic situation, the education and health systems, and their overall levels of 
happiness (dependent variables). In identifying the relationships and 
associations, this work provides an exploratory starting point for thinking 
through issues relating to the direction and magnitude of causation in relation to 
particular policy areas enacted by decentralised institutions. In our econometric 
analysis we resort to the use of pooled cross-sections referring to different 
years. This approach allows us to introduce a temporal dimension in the 
empirical model. That is, decentralisation measures not only vary by country, 
but also with time. Our outcome variables are individuals’ self-reported 
subjective indicators. This circumstance implies that the effect of the country 
level covariates on the outcome is more sensible to vary, in some cases in a 
non-negligible way, in different periods of time. 
 
4.6 Results of the analysis 
The top half of Table 4.2 depicts the results for the individual features which 
may affect SWB and levels of satisfaction. These results are virtually all 
statistically significant and, by and large, reproduce those reported in previous 
empirical analyses, underlining the robustness of the exercise.  First, age 
matters for happiness and satisfaction with institutions and policies. SWB and 
satisfaction tend to decrease with age, but the relationship is U-shaped, as 
happiness and satisfaction increase after middle-age. Women tend to be 
happier, but less satisfied than men with institutions and with the economic 
situation, democracy and the health system in particular. Also as expected, 
married people tend to report greater levels of overall happiness and 
satisfaction that those separated, divorced, widowed or never married. The only 
partial exception are widowed individuals, who, once controlled for everything 
else, have levels of satisfaction with government, democracy and the health 
system that are similar or superior to those married. Higher levels of education 
yield happier people, but more critical with the state of democracy, the economy 
and the delivery of public services. Health is also an important determinant of 
happiness and satisfaction. The lower is the level of self-reported health, then 
                                                 
10  Further details on the data can be found in Diaz-Serrano and  
Rodríguez-Pose (2011). 
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the lower is the SWB and satisfaction with institutions. Larger households tend 
to be happier, but, with the exception of the state of the health system, not 
necessarily more or less satisfied with institutions than smaller households. 
Right-leaning individuals also tend to be happier and generally more satisfied 
with institutions and the state of public services than left-leaning ones. Non-
nationals are also happier than nationals, but not more satisfied with public 
services. And, as could be expected, those who report that they live comfortably 
are happier and more satisfied than those who consider that they are in a very 
difficult or difficult position or simply coping. The strongest associations with 
happiness and satisfaction with institutions comes, however, from two variables: 
religiosity and trust. Religious individuals, regardless of the denomination of 
their church, tend to be significantly happier, when other factors are controlled 
for, that those reporting a lower level of religiosity. And trusting individuals, 
reinforcing the strong effects reported by Helliwell and Wang (2010) reveal 
themselves as the happiest and most satisfied of all. The distinction between 
overall happiness and satisfaction with particular institutions is also an important 
one. While age, marital status, self reported health, feeling about household 
income, trust, religiosity, and political orientation display similar coefficients both 
on the different satisfaction domains as on happiness, gender, education and 
citizenship lead to impacts that are considerably different in terms of overall 
happiness, relative to the level of satisfaction with economic and political 
institutions and with specific policies.  
Having controlled that our results conform to previous analyses of the 
personality and socio-demographic traits behind happiness and institutional 
satisfaction, in the bottom half of Table 4.2 we now turn to how political and 
fiscal decentralisation indicators affect these factors.  In order to allow for 
comparisons across alternative models, in Table 4.3 we report the elasticities 
for the decentralisation indicators. Our estimates reveal that greater political 
local autonomy matters for the satisfaction of individuals with political 
institutions and public polices and for their overall happiness. Political 
decentralisation has a significant and positive effect on happiness and on the 
majority of the satisfaction domains considered. Political decentralisation leads 
to greater satisfaction with democracy and with government, as well as with the 
health system. It is also associated to greater overall happiness. In contrast, 
there is no statistically significant association between more autonomy and the 
perception of the state of the economy or with the education system (Table 4.2).  
If we focus on the specific constituents of political decentralisation, the RAI 
index significantly raises happiness, satisfaction with democracy and 
satisfaction with the state of the health services in the country. It is in this latter 
domain where the RAI reports the largest effect: for example, a 10% increase in 
the RAI index generates almost a 1.4% increase in an individual’s level of 
satisfaction with the state of health services (elasticity of 0.136). Other 
aggregated decentralisation indexes - self-rule, law making and shared-rule – 
also exhibit an effect on happiness and the different satisfaction domains. 
Shared-rule and law-making are positively and significantly associated with 
happiness, satisfaction with government and health services, while self-rule 
does it on the same variables and also on satisfaction with democracy (Table 
4.2).  The disaggregated factors behind the composite political decentralisation 
indices individually also display a positive and generally significant with the 
34 
 
diverse measures of satisfaction with institutions and happiness considered. In 
particular, variables such as fiscal autonomy, which indicates the extent to 
which a decentralised adminstration controls its own taxation, and executive 
and fiscal control, both measures of the influence of local and regional 
governments on national policy and taxation, respectively, display a very strong 
correlation with overall levels of satisfaction and happiness. 
 
If we focus on the six dependent variables considered, overall happiness and 
satisfaction with the state of health services are the two outcomes that exhibit a 
greater sensitivity to decentralisation, followed by satisfaction with the 
government and satisfaction with democracy. That is, political decentralisation 
seems to have a much greater effect on those variables that affect the 
perception of individuals about the more political institutions (democracy and 
government) and, through them, on overall SWB. In contrast, there seems 
whether policies are conducted at a local, regional or national scale does not 
affect, either positively or negatively, individual perceptions about the economy.   
Fiscal decentralisation also exerts a significant effect on the level of satisfaction 
with political institutions. Practically all fiscal decentralisation indexes are 
statistically significant at one percent level in all the satisfaction equations. In 
addition, fiscal decentralisation is important in determining satisfaction with the 
economic situation and with the state of the education system, whereas political 
decentralisation is not (Table 4.2). Sub-national capital expenditure is the only 
variable that consistently exerts a positive and significant influence on the level 
of satisfaction with institutions. However, as pointed by Rodríguez-Pose and 
Tjimstra (2009), decentralisation processes in Europe and elsewhere in the 
world, have tended to lead to increases in current expenditure at the expense of 
capital expenditure. The dependent variables which exhibit a greater response 
to the specific indexes of fiscal decentralisation are satisfaction with economic 
situation, the government, democracy and the education system. The fact that 
fiscal decentralisation exert a significant effect on satisfaction with the education 
system, whereas political decentralisation does not may indicate that citizen’s 
prefer a better resourced education system, regardless of whether the political 
decisions are taken at the local or at the national level.   
 
4.7 Conclusions and policy implications 
The positive effect of political and fiscal decentralisation variables on 
satisfaction and happiness is an interesting one. This establishes a relationship 
whereby citizens appear to be happy not only  with the transfer of resources – 
which is an indicator of the capacity of local governments to implement policies 
- but also with the ability to conduct policies at the local level – which is 
represented here by the transfer of powers to sub-national governments. The 
association between greater decentralisation and happiness is also, with the 
exception of satisfaction with the health system, more strongly associated with 
more abstract constructs, such as satisfaction with government or democracy or 
overall happiness, than with more concrete ones, as satisfaction with the 
economy or with the education system. The fiscal dimension, which represents 
a more concrete dimension of decentralisation, is wholly connected with 
satisfaction and happiness. The results reveal that citizens appear to be happy 
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with the principle that their local governments can have a say on their daily 
politics and policies and with their actual capacity to deliver. Overall, the results 
highlight that both political and fiscal decentralisation matter, but that it is this 
latter dimension of decentralisation which seems to be more relevant for 
citizens. Decentralisation matters positively for the satisfaction of individuals 
with political institutions and with the specific delivery of some public goods and 
services. Policies from decentralised governments can therefore be envisaged 
to influence individual happiness. 
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5 Decentralisation and Inequality  
5.1 Introduction 
In this section, we address the relationship between fiscal and political 
decentralisation, income inequality and level of development within regions. 
Using Moderated Multiple Regression analysis applied to survey responses from 
more than 100,000 individuals in the European Union (EU), it addresses two 
main questions. First, whether decentralisation in western Europe has an effect 
on within regional interpersonal inequality. Second, whether this possible 
relationship is mediated by the level of economic development of the region. This 
section considers interpersonal inequalities within regions only (dependent 
Variable) and the results of the analysis show that greater fiscal and political 
decentralisation is associated with lower interpersonal income inequality, but that 
this relationship is far from linear. As regional income rises, further 
decentralisation is connected to a lower decrease or even to an increase in 
inequality. This finding is robust to the measurement and definition of income 
inequality, as well as to the weighting of the spatial units by their population size. 
In terms of causation, the findings suggest the potential for particular forms of 
decentralisation to ameliorate inter-personal income inequalities under certain 
conditions and that this capability is strongly determined by overall levels of 
development. 
There has been no shortage of interest on the economic implications of the 
decentralisation of power and resources to lower tiers of government. The 
overwhelming majority of the analyses have been macro-approaches concerned 
with the impact of decentralisation on territories – mainly regions and countries 
(Rodríguez-Pose, and Ezcurra 2010). There has been, however, much less 
interest on the potential influence of decentralisation at a micro level. The impact 
of decentralisation on individuals has been almost completely overlooked by the 
literature. One exception is Morelli and Seaman (2007) who found that 
decentralisation increased interpersonal inequality, although the study did not 
clarify the factors behind this relationship.  
 
5.2 Decentralisation, income inequality and level of development 
Decentralisation of powers and resources to lower tiers of government can – 
under different circumstances and in different contexts – contribute to both 
increase and reduce interpersonal inequalities. Decentralisation can reduce inter-
personal inequalities in the following ways: 
• Exploiting the information advantage over central government and 
increase the degree of efficiency in the allocation of resources better 
matched to the preferences of local citizens (Tiebout, 1956; Oates, 1972). 
• Bringing government closer to the people and providing better information 
about local preferences to inform the optimal mix of local policies 
(Lessmann, 2000). 
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• Promoting greater voice, transparency and participation through enhanced 
accountability to local citizens 
• Limiting the opportunities for corruption and interest group capture of the 
returns of public policies through greater transparency and accountability 
(Weingast, 2009). 
Conversely, decentralisation can be argued to increase inter-personal 
inequalities in the following ways: 
• Weakening the capacity of central government to play an equalising role to 
achieve balanced distributions of income through social and territorial 
transfers from the rich to the poor (Oates, 1972). 
• Diversity and variation in the availability and quality of public services 
between places generates unequal individual access and provision 
regardless of preferences – the so-called ‘postcode lottery’ issue in the 
context of England. 
• Sub-national institutions are likely to attract less skilled and capable 
officials and decision-makers and can be less efficient at policy design and 
delivery (Prud'homme, R. 1995). 
• Increasing social fragmentation and inequality can result if local vested 
interests are powerful and accountability is weak – a situation most likely 
to happen in less developed and less equal territories (Neyapti, 2006). 
Whether decentralisation is good or bad for inter-personal inequality may be 
highly dependent upon the level of development of a territory. The reasons for 
this include: 
• Poor territories with relative greater needs face greater budget constraints 
than richer territories with relatively less need and intergovernmental grants 
can constitute the main source of local revenues. Greater decentralisation can 
curtail these equalisation transfers from richer to poorer areas and poorer 
places can end up with inadequate independent resources to tackle local 
inequality and develop meaningful fiscal autonomy (Weingast, 2009). 
• The greater capacity of richer local and regional authorities to rely on their 
own revenues means that they are often in a better shape to address 
inequality problems and a ‘threshold level of economic development’ exists at 
which fiscal decentralisation becomes attractive and more likely to deliver a 
reduction in inequality (Oates, 2006). 
As a consequence, poorer areas can be argued to be limited in their ability to 
deliver greater interpersonal equality. Although when there are strong 
inefficiencies within a system and these are properly addressed by 
decentralisation processes and under-utilised resources are tapped, it may be 
the case that the efficiency gains may be greater in those areas where the 
inefficiencies were originally larger (Rodríguez-Pose, and Ezcurra 2010). If such 
efficiency gains are put to good use, interpersonal inequality would decrease 
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faster in less developed than in more developed areas, although large 
institutional and capacity constraints may operate in an opposite direction. 
Overall, little is known about the potential implications of decentralisation for 
interpersonal inequality and that the potential factors at play can derive either in 
greater or in lower inequality. The relationship is also likely to be influenced by 
the level of development of a region or a locality. Hence the questions of whether 
decentralisation has an effect on within regional interpersonal inequality and 
whether this possible relationship is mediated by the level of economic 
development of the region remain open and have to be addressed from an 
empirical perspective. 
 
5.3 Research methodology 
We use a Moderated Multiple Regression (MMR) analysis to examine whether 
regional per-capita income intervenes in the relationship between fiscal and 
political decentralisation and income inequality within regions11. In other words, 
we examine whether the magnitude of this relation varies across different 
development levels and plot the relationship between decentralisation and 
income inequality at high and low levels of regional per-capita income. 
The econometric specification is based on panel data analysis in order to reduce 
measurement error on income inequalities, to minimise potential problems of 
omitted variable bias, to increase degrees of freedom, and to improve the 
accuracy of the parameter estimates. The econometric specification uses 
available data at regional and national levels (see Table 5.1)12. Regional 
variables are based either on micro or macro data. Regional variables based on 
micro data are extracted from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) 
data survey, while regional variables based on macro data stem from Eurostat’s 
Regio dataset. National variables are extracted from the World Bank and the 
work by Hooghe et al. (2008). The resulting dataset includes data for 102 regions 
at NUTS I or II level from 13 countries in Western Europe between 1995 and 
2000, the only years for which the ECHP is available (NUTS I: Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Spain and 
Sweden; NUTS II: Portugal and the United Kingdom). 
 
                                                 
11  Further details on the research methodology, including the econometric specification, 
data and variables, are contained in Tselios et al. (2010). 
12  Robust data at the local scale was not available. 
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Table 5.1 Regional and national variables 
Regional Variables National variables 
Interpersonal income inequalities 
within a region (dependent variable) 
Fiscal decentralisation (explanatory 
variable) 
Regional per-capita income 
(moderator) 
Political decentralisation (explanatory 
variable) 
Regional educational endowment 
(control variable: explanatory 
variable) 
Trade openness (explanatory 
variable) 
Regional unemployment (control 
variable: explanatory variable) 
Public sector size (explanatory 
variable) 
Regional sectoral composition 
(control variable: explanatory 
variable)  
 
 
5.4 Research findings 
The empirical analysis exploits the panel structure of the dataset, for the 102 EU 
regions included in the analysis over the period 1995-2000. Table 5.2 displays 
the fixed effects results when dependent variable is income inequality for the 
whole population measured using the Theil index. (The Theil minimum value is 0 
for perfect equality and its maximum value is the logarithm of regional population). 
The dependent variable is defined as (a) income inequality for the whole 
population within a region (in other words, income inequality for the whole 
regional population), (b) income inequality for normally working people within a 
region. Table 5.2 displays case (a). 
 
In Table 5.2, Regression 1 shows that for the case of European regions there is a 
negative and statistically significant impact of fiscal decentralisation, measured 
by the sub-national share in total government expenditure, on income inequality. 
The interaction term of fiscal decentralisation with per-capita income is positive 
and significant. This means that while greater fiscal decentralisation has 
contributed to a reduction of within-region interpersonal inequality, the 
relationship is moderated by the level of development of the region. As income 
rises, the capacity of fiscal decentralisation to contribute to a reduction in 
interpersonal inequality wanes (Table 5.2, Regression 1). This implies that, while 
in less developed regions higher levels of fiscal decentralisation are associated 
with a decline in within regional interpersonal inequality, this association is 
reversed in better-off regions. Figure 5.2 interprets the interaction terms. 
Wealthier regions with higher levels of fiscal decentralisation have marginally 
higher rates of interpersonal inequality than those in more centralised settings 
(Figure 5.1, 1a). Hence as income rises, further decentralisation is connected to 
an increase in inequality. When fiscal decentralisation is measured by the sub-
national share in total government revenue, rather than expenditure, the results 
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are generally similar. This may be simply due because both proxies for fiscal 
decentralisation are highly correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.9858). As 
shown in Regression 2 in Table 5.2, greater decentralisation is associated with 
lower inequality, and this relationship wanes as income rises. The main 
difference of using local and regional revenue rather than expenditure as a proxy 
for fiscal decentralisation is that, as regional income rises, further decentralisation 
is not connected to an increase in inequality, but to a lower decrease in 
interpersonal inequality than at lower levels of income (Figure 5.1b). Hence, and 
in contrast to what could have been expected from the discussion in the 
theoretical section, the relationship between decentralisation and income 
inequality is negative for less developed European regions, although this effect 
peters out as regional income rises. 
 
When we turn to the potential impact of political decentralisation on income 
inequality (Table 5.2, Regressions 3-5), the regression results show once again a 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on decentralisation for all proxies 
(self-rule, shared-rule, and (Regional Authority Index) RAI-total) and a positive 
and statistically significant coefficient on the interaction term of decentralisation 
with per-capita income. A greater degree of political decentralisation – regardless 
of how it is measured – is associated with lower levels of income inequality. As in 
the case of fiscal decentralisation, the decentralisation-inequality relationship is 
sensitive to the level of development of the region concerned. For less developed 
regions, it is negative, with political decentralisation contributing to a reduction of 
interpersonal inequalities, when self-rule and RAI-total are used as proxies of 
political decentralisation. In richer regions, in contrast, higher levels of self-rule 
and RAI-total are associated with an increase in interpersonal inequality (Figure 
5.1, 1c and 1e). When shared-rule is used as the proxy for political 
decentralisation, higher levels of decentralisation lead to a decline in 
interpersonal disparities in both low and high income regions, although the slope 
of the decline is greater for poorer than for richer regions (Figure 5.1, 1d). 
 
As discussed above, the control variables included in the model also have an 
influence over within region inequality levels. Income inequality can be affected 
not only by the national factors of fiscal and political decentralisation, but also by 
the trade openness and the public sector size, as well as by the unemployment 
rate, the sectoral structure of the region, and by the level of education of the 
population. In Table 5.2, Regressions 6 and 7 examine the association between 
trade openness and income inequality, as well as between public sector size and 
inequality, and whether these associations are moderated by regional economic 
development. The results indicate that these associations are not as clear cut as 
could have been expected in theory. Apart from the coefficient on the interaction 
term of trade openness with income per capita, which is positive and statistically 
significant, no other coefficient is significant, meaning that the association 
between trade and public sector size, on the one hand, and within region income 
inequality, on the other, is weaker than what could have been expected. The 
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unemployment rate, the sectoral structure of the region, and, to a much lesser 
extent, the level of education of the population display a much stronger 
association with the level of regional interpersonal inequality (Table 5.2, 
Regressions 1-11). The regression coefficients highlight that the higher the 
percentage of locals with tertiary education, the lower the income inequality. 
Regional unemployment increases, as expected, income inequality and a rise in 
the added value per capita of agriculture and industry is associated with a 
decrease in inequality, while the impact of services is unclear. 
Regressions 8-9 display the combined impact of fiscal and political 
decentralisation on interpersonal income inequality within regions. The results 
highlight that the association between fiscal decentralisation and inequality is 
stronger and more robust than that of political decentralisation and inequality: the 
coefficients of political decentralisation (RAI-total) are not robust to the inclusion 
of the fiscal decentralisation variables and become insignificant. In contrast, the 
fiscal decentralisation variables remain highly significant with the same 
coefficients as described above. 
The analysis was recalculated using weighted regressions (Regressions 10-11). 
The use of population weights allows us to control for the regional and national 
size as it may hide greater heterogeneity and thus the possibility for larger local 
governments to undertake widely different policies than in smaller, more 
homogeneous, and compact regions and countries. The regression results using 
weighted variables show the robustness of our previous results. Once again, 
greater decentralisation is associated with lower inequality, but as income rises, 
further decentralisation is connected to an increase or to a lower decrease in 
inequality. The outliers were checked and omitted producing virtually no effect on 
the results. The above findings are also robust to changing the measure (the Gini 
index, the squared coefficient of variation and the Atkinson index) and the 
definition of income inequality (income inequality for normally working people). 
 
5.5 Conclusions and policy implications 
By using micro data in order to measure the level of interpersonal inequality for 
the regions of western Europe, we have been able to address whether 
decentralisation matters for the evolution of within regional interpersonal 
inequality and whether this relationship is mediated by the level of development 
of the region. The results of our Moderated Multiple Regression analysis highlight 
that the influence of decentralisation on interpersonal inequality is much stronger 
than expected.  Although the direction of the relationship between both factors 
was uncertain, the results of the analysis here demonstrates that greater fiscal – 
more than political – decentralisation is associated with lower income inequality. 
They also suggest that this relationship is highly influenced by the level of 
development of the region to which authority and funds are being decentralised. 
However, the sign of the relationship counters most theoretical predictions. 
Against the view that worse-off regions would be disadvantaged because of 
capacity and funding constraints, which could prevent them from effectively 
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implementing policies which could reduce interpersonal inequality, it is precisely 
these less well-off regions which seem to be benefiting the most from the 
inequality-reducing effects of fiscal decentralisation processes. There is no 
identifiable threshold level because as income rises, the association declines and 
even becomes positive, with some higher income regions displaying a higher 
degree of interpersonal inequality than their more centralised counterparts13. It is 
not possible to allocate particular regions to specific categories because our 
results are based on NUTS I or II level and the regression results depict the 
'average' trend for the Western European countries. There appears to be 
potential, then, for particular kinds of decentralisation to address inter-personal 
income inequalities in specific contexts and this capability is influenced by overall 
levels of development.  
Although given the exploratory nature of the analysis, its results should be 
considered with caution especially in extending its findings from the regional to 
the local levels, the policy implications of its findings suggest: 
• Increased fiscal – more than political – decentralisation should be considered 
given its positive association with lower levels of income inequality. 
• Less well-off regions in particular could benefit from the inequality-reducing 
effects of enhanced fiscal decentralisation. 
• Consideration needs to be given to how further decentralisation might affect 
the high levels of inter-personal inequality evident within already highly 
decentralised and high income regions. 
In contrast to the studies which have focused on aggregate outcomes about the 
impact of greater levels of autonomy on aggregate growth and on inter-territorial 
disparities, the focus on the impacts of decentralisation on individuals creates a 
potentially richer and useful field for the study of the implications of changing the 
scales at which policies are implemented. If decentralisation is all about 
delivering better policies to individuals, looking precisely at those individuals may 
offer a more accurate evaluation of its outcomes.  
                                                 
13  It should be noted that inter-regional income inequality is an important component of the 
inequality-decentralisation relationship (Rodríguez-Pose and Tselios, 2009). 
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Figure 5.2: Interpretation of the interactions 
1a: Regression 1 
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1c: Regression 3 
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1d: Regression 4 
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1e: Regression 5 
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6 Conclusions and policy implications  
This report has sought to examine the evidence about the impacts of 
decentralisation in order to inform government policy concerning England in relation 
to decentralisation, localism and the ‘Big Society’. We have sought to situate the 
study in the international principally peer-reviewed literature which typically concerns 
the decentralisation of authority from national to sub-national (mainly regional) 
governments. We have been less concerned about spatial scale than we have about 
what we can learn about decentralisation as a general principle in the rescaling of 
the state. The findings of the study demonstrate that there are many different types 
of decentralisation at various spatial scales and embodying a range of powers and 
resources. Moreover, the context and conditions of the design, rationale and 
implementation of decentralisation strongly shape its effects. As a result, in the 
literature, the impacts of decentralisation on issues such as the efficiency and 
accessibility of local services and on local growth, appear ambiguous and 
inconclusive. Indeed, looking at the evidence in the round, our analysis accords with 
Treisman’s argument who suggests that: 
… it is hard to reach any general conclusions about whether political – or 
administrative, or fiscal – decentralisation will improve or impair the quality of 
government and economic performance. They will have many effects, driving 
in different directions on different dimensions. These effects depend on 
numerous conditions, many of which are difficult to disentangle in theory and 
identify in practice. As one would expect, empirical studies have found almost 
no solid, general results about the consequences of decentralisation. 
Decentralizing government in a particular place and time is very much a leap 
into the dark (Treisman, 2007: 274). 
Our study attempts to address the difficulties identified by Treisman by providing a 
detailed review of the limited range of empirical analyses and evidence of the impact 
of decentralisation on the efficiency of local services. This review demonstrates a 
range of contradictory conclusions from which it is very difficult to draw general 
lessons for policy. Disentangling the impacts of decentralisation at particular spatial 
scales (e.g. regional versus local) proves to be especially difficult and the literature 
rarely preoccupies itself with this distinction. Most existing studies are mainly 
concerned variously with measuring impacts at the sub-national scale – for example 
of Spanish Autonomous Communities, Swiss Cantons and Italian Regions – and 
only in a few cases with the municipality and not all with neighbourhoods. 
We observe the inherent difficulties of measuring the impacts of decentralisation 
which partly explain the apparently contradictory results from various studies and 
also the difficulties of comparing between cases selected from different national 
contexts.  For this reason we use a novel approach to address two specific issues 
where research on the impacts of decentralisation has to date been limited, but are 
especially relevant to government’s current emphasis upon the individual and highly 
local forms of decentralisation. The novelty of our approach is that it focuses on the 
impact of decentralisation on the individual rather than the performance of territorial 
jurisdictions. This has a number of advantages. First, it focuses attention on 
decentralisation as a principle rather than seeking to disentangle its impacts at 
different spatial scales. Second, current government policy debates are especially 
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concerned with the impacts of decentralisation on individuals. The analyses reported 
in this study represent the first attempt to address this question directly.  
With our focus on the individual in mind, we examine the impacts of decentralisation 
on subjective wellbeing (SWB) and inter-personal inequality and level of 
development.  
For subjective wellbeing, we find a positive effect of political and fiscal 
decentralisation on satisfaction and happiness. This establishes a relationship 
whereby citizens appear to be happy not only  with the transfer of resources – which 
is an indicator of the capacity of local governments to implement policies - but also 
with the ability to conduct policies at the local level – which is represented here by 
the transfer of powers to sub-national governments. The association between 
greater decentralisation and happiness is also, with the exception of satisfaction with 
the health system, more strongly associated with more abstract constructs, such as 
satisfaction with government or democracy or overall happiness, than with more 
concrete ones, as satisfaction with the economy or with the education system. The 
fiscal dimension, which represents a more concrete dimension of decentralisation, is 
wholly connected with satisfaction and happiness. The results reveal that citizens 
appear to be happy with the principle that their local governments can have a say on 
their daily politics and policies and with their actual capacity to deliver. Overall, the 
results highlight that both political and fiscal decentralisation matter, but that it is this 
latter dimension of decentralisation which seems to be more relevant for citizens. 
Decentralisation matters positively for the satisfaction of individuals with political 
institutions and with the specific delivery of some public goods and services. The 
overall level of resources is important too – even overriding level of decision-making, 
for example, in relation to education. Given these relationships, it is feasible, then, to 
envisage a causal relationship between policies from decentralised governments and 
individual happiness. 
For income inequality and level of development,  the results of the analysis 
demonstrate that greater fiscal – more than political – decentralisation is associated 
with lower inter-personal income inequality. They also suggest that this relationship 
is highly influenced by the level of development of the region to which authority and 
funds are being decentralised. Against the view that worse-off regions would be 
disadvantaged because of capacity and funding constraints, which could prevent 
them from effectively implementing policies which could reduce interpersonal 
inequality, it is precisely these less well-off regions which seem to be benefiting the 
most from the inequality-reducing effects of fiscal decentralisation processes. As 
income rises, the association declines and even becomes positive, with some higher 
income regions displaying a higher degree of interpersonal inequality than their more 
centralised counterparts. Given these findings, it is feasible to suggest the potential 
for specific kinds of decentralisation to address inter-personal income inequalities in 
particular contexts and that overall levels of development are critical in shaping this 
capacity. 
These results cast powerful light on two key areas of the government policy debate. 
There is evidence to suggest that decentralisation can contribute to an improved 
sense of citizen well-being and that concerns that, in particular contexts, 
decentralisation will generate increased inequality may have been overstated. What 
are the policy implications of these findings? Any policy implications must be highly 
qualified given the different kinds of decentralisation and the conditional nature of its 
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operation that makes it highly dependent upon the context in which it is introduced. 
In addition, given the exploratory nature of the analysis, the results should be 
considered with caution in shaping policy in specific cases especially in directly 
attributing causation, given the strength of quantitative analysis in identifying and 
measuring the extant relationships, and extending its findings from the regional to 
the local level. 
With these caveats in mind our research allows us to suggest the following policy 
issues. 
There is a need for much greater clarity in the definition, specification and rationale 
of exactly what kind and degree of decentralisation is planned by the government in 
England, and what its precise aims goals are: Is it seeking to make services more 
efficient or more accountable? Is the aim to improve subjective wellbeing? Is the goal 
to reducing levels of inter-personal inequality? In particular, the relationships 
between decentralisation and its spatial scale need to be explained and clarified with 
greater care.  Although government may not be seeking a prescriptive template, the 
principles of the particular kinds of decentralisation it is seeking need to reflect what 
the review and evidence here demonstrates: decentralisation can have positive (and 
negative) impacts at various spatial scales and but current policy focuses only the 
local scale as the source of gains in efficiency and accountability.  The case for the 
government’s particular kind of decentralisation needs clearer explanation and 
stronger evidence. Moreover, the evidence on the impacts of decentralisation mainly 
concerns the performance of sub-national jurisdictions (e.g. regions, provinces, 
municipalities) with very little treatment of issues that could be seen as proxies of 
localism as understood in current debates about the governance of England.  
The particular role of local government in the government’s decentralisation 
programme needs much clearer specification. As a recent review noted, it is unclear 
whether the decentralisation within this version of localism ends at the local authority 
level or whether it begins from this level to communities and neighbourhoods14. The 
results reported here strongly suggest that, internationally, citizens are positive in the 
context of especially the fiscal dimensions and capacities of decentralised institutions 
at the sub-national level and associate decentralised institutions with higher levels of 
personal subjective well-being. As a key decentralised institution in the English 
context, local government has a critical role in articulating and representing the 
potential of the kinds of decentralisation and localism that the government seeks. 
This role then begs the question of whether and how local government can be 
enabled and supported to undertake this task given its particular level of fiscal 
decentralisation in England. In addition, as government seeks decentralisation 
beneath the level of local government, this raises the question of how such 
decentralisation processes unfold when focused upon the spatial scales of 
communities and neighbourhoods or even at the level of individual citizens. These 
issues require further investigation and review of the available evidence.  
If subjective well-being is emerging as a central focus of government policy then the  
evidence reported here suggests decentralisation could play a significant role in its 
improvement. However, the nature and extent of decentralisation and the resources 
attached to it would seem to be critical in determining the chances of its success.  
                                                 
14 See Deloitte (2011).  
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Our findings suggest that increased fiscal – more than political – decentralisation 
should be considered given its positive association with lower levels of income 
inequality. Less well-off places in particular could benefit from the inequality-reducing 
effects of enhanced fiscal decentralisation. Moreover, consideration needs to be 
given to how further decentralisation will the high levels of inter-personal inequality 
within already highly decentralised and high income localities.  
Finally, given the claims being made for its potential impacts, more attention and 
clarity on assessment and evaluation of the government’s strategy on 
decentralisation and localism will be welcomed, particularly in relation to the pros 
and cons identified in this report. 
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